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plumerge@gmail.com			 Suppositional	 reasoning	 can	 seem	 spooky.	 Suppositional	reasoners	 allegedly	 (e.g.)	 “extract	 knowledge	 from	 the	 sheer	workings	 of	 their	 own	 minds”	 (Rosa),	 even	 where	 the	knowledge	 is	 synthetic	 a	 posteriori.	 Can	 literary	 fiction	 pull	such	 a	 rabbit	 out	 of	 its	 hat?	 Where	 P	 is	 a	 work’s	 fictional	“premise,”	 some	 hold	 that	 some	 works	 reason	 declaratively	(supposing	 P,	 Q),	 imperatively	 (supposing	 P,	 do	 Q),	 or	interrogatively	(supposing	P,	Q?).	True,	 I	will	argue,	although	only	with	much	qualification.			 KEYWORDS:	 argument	 in	 fiction,	 didacticism,	 literary	cognitivism,	 premise-based	 reasoning,	 suppositional	reasoning,	thought	experiments			1.	INTRODUCTION		Some	 come	 close	 to	 claiming	 that	 literary	 fiction	 can	 be	 suppositional	reasoning.	For	 instance,	Green	 (2010,	p.	360)	says	 that	Huxley’s	Brave	
New	World	“can	plausibly	be	construed	as	taking	the	form	of	a	reductio	
ad	absurdum,”	which	he	states	as	follows:		1 Suppose	a	society	were	organized	along	the	lines	dictated	by	hedonistic	utilitarianism.	2 In	 such	 a	world,	 people	would	 lack	 freedom	 of	 thought,	freedom	 of	 expression,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 cultivate	 the	capacities	for	critical	reflection	on	their	surroundings.	3 Therefore,	in	such	a	world,	life	would	be	intolerable	to	all	but	 those	 who	 have	 lost	 the	 capacity	 for	 the	 activities	mentioned	in	premise	(2).	4 Therefore	such	a	world	would	be	unacceptable.	5 Therefore,	hedonistic	utilitarianism	is	an	incorrect	theory	of	how	to	achieve	happiness.		Comparatively	 speaking,	 suppositional	 reasoning	 is	 a	 puzzling	orphan	child	in	argument	studies	and	epistemology.	Authors	noting	the	
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inattention	range	at	 least	from	Fisher	thirty	years	ago	(1989,	p.	401ff.)	to	Rosa	(2019,	p.	157;	cf.,	e.g.,	Green,	2000,	p.	377	and	Dogramaci,	2016,	p.	889).	On	the	other	hand,	suppositional	reasoning	is	well-established	in	formal	logic,	particularly	as	conditional	proof,	the	core	idea	of	which	is:	 ‘Suppose	 p.	 It	 follows	 that	 q	 [1	 and	 2	 in	 the	 reductio	 above].	Therefore,	 if	p	 then	q’.	But	even	 this	evokes	a	vexed	question,	viz.,	 the	extent	 to	which	 a	 piece	 of	 suppositional	 reasoning	 can	be	 analyzed	 in	terms	 of	 a	 conditional	 and	 vice	 versa.	 For	 instance,	 statements	 of	 the	form	 ‘if	 p	 then	 q’	 have	 truth-values,	 whereas	 statements	 of	 the	 form	‘supposing	p,	q’	may	appear	to	lack	truth-values.	Barnett	(2006,	esp.	pp.	535-536)	 argues	 that	 such	 (compound)	 suppositional	 statements	 are	true	 if	 p	 and	 q	 are	 each	 true,	 false	 if	 p	 is	 true	 and	 q	 is	 false,	 yet	 in	contrast	 to	 (e.g.)	 the	material	 conditional,	 in	 the	 two	 cases	where	p	 is	false,	 the	 statement	 cannot	 be	 evaluated	 because	 evaluating	 it	 would	amount	 to	 determining	 “whether	 [q]	while	 supposing	 not	 just	 that	 [p]	but	 also	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 [p].”	 On	 this	 suppositional	understanding	 of	 the	 conditional,	 the	 so-called	 paradoxes	 of	 material	implication	disappear	and	a	door	is	open	to	logics	alternative	to	classical	logic.		 In	fact,	suppositional	reasoning	can	seem	downright	spooky,	and	it	 may	 be	 no	 accident	 that	 deriving	 knowledge	 from	 fiction	 can	 seem	equally	 spooky.	 Suppositional	 reasoners	 allegedly	 “extract	 knowledge	from	the	sheer	workings	of	their	own	minds”	(Rosa,	p.	157),	even	where	the	 knowledge	 is	 synthetic	 a	 posteriori	 (Balcerak	 Jackson	 &	 Balcerak	Jackson,	 2013).	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 reasoning	 itself—in	 the	 form	 of	suppositional	reasoning—might	be	a	source	of	knowledge	distinct	from	reasoning	 understood	 as	 the	 means	 of	 transmitting	 knowledge	 from	premises	 to	 conclusion.	An	example	Rosa	gives	 (pp.	156-157,	170;	 the	Balcerak	 Jacksons	 cite	 a	 similar	 case,	 pp.	 116,	 120)	 of	 putatively	 “a	priori”	 knowledge	 is:	 ‘Suppose	 that	 Lucy	 is	 a	 feminist	 philosopher.	 It	follows	 that	 some	 feminists	 are	 philosophers.	 Therefore,	 if	 Lucy	 is	 a	feminist	philosopher,	then	some	feminists	are	philosophers.’	(One	does	wonder	about	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	appearance	of	 the	proper	name	‘Lucy’	here	undermines	the	a	priority	claim,	but	never	mind.)	In	order	to	reason	 in	 this	way,	 one	 need	 not	 have	 any	 justification	 that	 Lucy	 is	 a	feminist	 philosopher	 (nor	 any	 justification	 that	 some	 feminists	 are	philosophers);	 indeed,	 one	 might	 believe	 that	 she	 is	 not,	 and	 have	justification	that	she	is	not,	but	be	supposing	that	she	is	‘for	the	sake	of	argument’.	 Thus,	 here	 it	 cannot	 be	 that	 knowledge	 or	 justification	 is	transmitted	 from	premises	 to	conclusion,	 in	contrast	 to	beliefs	arrived	at	 by	 nonsuppositional	 reasoning,	 wherein	 the	 premises	 are	 taken	 or	asserted	to	be	true.	Can	suppositional	 reasoning	be	a	source	of	 less	 trivial-seeming	knowledge?	The	Balcerak	Jacksons	(p.	120)	propose	a	non	a	priori	case:	
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A	human-cannonball	has	sustained	an	injury	in	his	profession	and	wants	to	prevent	a	reoccurrence.	He	asks	himself,	“if	the	stage	lighting	rigs	had	
been	a	bit	higher,	would	I	have	landed	in	the	net?”	In	his	imagination	he	visually	 models	 the	 scenario	 with	 the	 rigs	 higher,	 and	 finds	 that	 he	safely	 lands	 in	 the	 net,	 not	 on	 the	 rigs	 again.	 He	 concludes	 with	 an	affirmative	answer	to	his	question.		 But,	you	say,	this	 is	 just	an	ordinary	 ‘thought	experiment’.	That	is	right,	yet	part	of	 the	aim	of	philosophers	 like	Rosa	and	the	Balcerak	Jacksons	is	to	argue	that	it	is	quite	mundane	for	reasoning	alone	to	be	a	source	 of	 knowledge	 or	 justification.	 Now	many	 contend	 that	 at	 least	some	 works	 of	 fictional	 literature	 constitute	 a	 class	 of	 thought	experiments	 (e.g.,	Carroll,	2002;	Elgin,	2007;	Swirski,	2007;	Mikkonen,	2013;	 Green,	 2010,	 2016,	 2017).	 Be	 that	 as	 it	 may	 (next	 section),	 if	works	 of	 fictional	 literature	 can	 holistically	 exhibit	 reasoning,	 our	question	 is	 whether	 that	 reasoning	 can	 significantly,	 not	 purely,	 be	suppositional	 reasoning.	 It	 does	 not	 matter	 for	 our	 purposes	 should	their	conclusions	be	based	on	premise-beliefs	as	well	as	suppositions.		2.	THOUGHT	EXPERIMENTS	AND	LITERARY	FICTION		Tooming	 (2018,	 pp.	 685-692)	 distinguishes	 between	 “mere	supposition,”	 presumably	 as	 in	 Green’s	 statement	 above	 of	 Huxley’s	
reductio,	 and	supposition	 that	 requires	mental	 imagery	 that	 “matches”	the	supposed	propositions(s),	presumably	as	 in	 the	human	cannonball	example.	 A	 critical	 question	 is	 whether	 cases	 like	 the	 latter	 actually	involve	 reasoning	 at	 all,	 as	 opposed	 to	 something	 on	 the	 order	 of	imaginative	 engagement.	 Could	 imagination	 function	 like	 perception	here	 in	 giving	 immediate	 prima	 facie	 justification	 for	 believing	 that	things	 would	 be/are	 the	 way	 they	 appear	 to	 be	 in	imagination/perception?	If	even	these	cases	do	not	involve	reasoning,	it	might	be	less	clear	how	works	of	fictional	literature	could.	For	one	thing,	these	works	 are	 regarded,	 in	 their	 essence,	 as	 ‘invitations	 to	 imagine’	(vs.	believe).	The	Balcerak	Jacksons	plausibly	argue	(pp.	115-122)	that	the	 human	 cannonball	 kind	 of	 case	 exhibits	 two	 ‘hallmarks	 of	reasoning’.	The	 first	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	 “content	gap”	 to	bridge	between	the	 first	 and	 final	mental	 states	 in	 the	 thought	 experiment.	 Following	Williamson	 (2007,	 ch.	 5),	 they	 propose	 that	 “we	 evaluate	 a	counterfactual	conditional	by	‘developing’	its	antecedent	in	certain	ways	via	mental	simulation,	and	then	check	to	see	if	the	consequent	is	true	in	the	simulation”	(p.	121).	In	contrast,	there	is	ordinarily	no	content	gap	to	 cross	 in	 having	 a	 perception	with	 a	 certain	 content	 and	 “forming	 a	belief	 with	 the	 same	 content”	 (p.	 119),	 e.g.,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 red	 circle.	Second,	it	is	appropriate	to	subject	the	transitions	that	bridge	the	gap	to	“epistemic	 appraisal	 and	 criticism”	 (p.	 122).	 It	 is	 typically	 a	 propos	 to	
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ask	 a	 thought	 experimenter	 to	 give	 reasons	 or	 justification	 for	 the	proposed	 result,	 whereas	 it	 is	 normally	 otiose	 to	 ask	 one	 to	 give	justification	for	a	perceptual	judgement	(e.g.,	that	we	are	approaching	a	log	in	the	middle	of	the	road)	other	than	it	looks	that	way.		 	As	 opposed	 to	 fiction	 on	 the	 order	 of	 ‘bodice	 rippers’,	 pulp	fiction,	 and	 the	 like,	 it	 is	 generally	 held	 that	 literary	 fiction	 is	 more	nuanced;	 it	 has	 a	 greater	 richness	 and	 complexity	 of	 character	development,	 plot,	 fine	 description,	 etc.,	 and	 also	 somehow	 shows	insight	 into	 human	 affairs.	 Is	 such	 insight	 achieved	 by	 holistically	exhibiting	suppositional	reasoning?	That	is	our	question,	so	our	focus	is	on	literary	fiction.	Now	certainly,	the	reasoning	in	thought	experiments,	if	 anything,	would	 be	 suppositional	 in	 nature.	 But	 there	 are	 problems	with	 regarding	 a	work	 of	 fictional	 literature	 as	 a	 thought	 experiment.	For	example,	within	science	the	epistemic	value	of	thought	experiments	is	 regarded	 as	 second	 best	 (or	 worse)	 to	 real	 experiments,	 but	 there	could	be	no	counterpart	to	this	within	literary	fiction.	Moreover,	there	is	an	inverse	relationship	between	parameters	of	evaluation.	Factors	that	make	 a	 thought	 experiment	 good	 (e.g.,	 straightforwardness	 and	precision)	tend	to	make	a	story	bad	(lack	of	nuance	and	subtlety),	and	vice	versa.	Egan	mentions	this	(2016,	p.	147),	and	that	 in	contrast	to	a	literary	 fiction,	 “the	 purpose	 of	 a	 thought	 experiment	 is	 exhausted	 in	making	 or	 contributing	 to	 an	 argument”;	 its	 aesthetic	 qualities	 are	basically	irrelevant,	as	is	indicated	by	the	fact	that	once	“we	remember	how	 a	 thought	 experiment	 runs,	we	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 reread	 it”	 (pp.	142-143).	For	instance,	the	power	and	cogency	of	a	good	philosophical	thought	 experiment	 may	 derive	 from	 its	 being	 a	 close	 analogical	argument,	 not	 from	 any	 embedded	 fictional	 narrative	 being	believable	like	 a	 novel,	 play,	 or	 short	 story;	 consider,	 e.g.,	 Thompson’s	 (1971)	celebrated,	 though	 hardly	 believable,	 thought	 experiment	 involving	 a	famous	 violinist	 plugged	 into	 your	 body	 for	 life	 support.	 This	 points	toward	 perhaps	 the	 most	 important	 difference	 for	 our	 purposes:	indirectness	is	not	a	distinctive	feature	of	thought	experiments,	but	it	is	for	any	global	argument	in	a	work	of	literary	fiction.			3.	DIDACTICISM	AND	INDIRECTNESS		If	 a	 work	 of	 literary	 fiction	 has	 a	 global	 argument,	 why	 should	 it	 be	indirect?	 The	 answer	 is	 that	 otherwise	 the	 work	 would	 be	 didactic,	which	 is	 a	distinctive	 fault	 for	 fictional	 literature.	However,	 given	 that	the	 term	 has	 a	 negative	 connotation,	 didacticism	 is	 a	 flaw	 to	 some	degree	 no	 matter	 where	 it	 appears,	 and	 this	 can	 lead	 to	 confusion.	Consider	Repp’s	view.	He	says	(2012,	pp.	271,	283):		
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Works	 of	 literature	 that	 are	 too	 overtly	 instructive	 are	
commonly	 faulted	 for	 being	 didactic…if	 we	 [as	 literary	cognitivists]	 value	 literature	 for	 the	 instruction	 it	 affords,	why	
would	 we	 ever	 object	 to	 overt	 instruction?...I	 propose	 the	
following	 answer:	 overt	 instruction	 can	 arouse	 suspicion	 of	
intellectual	 vices	 in	 the	 author,	 such	 as	 intellectual	 arrogance,	
dogmatism,	 and	 prejudice,	 which	 can	 make	 the	 lessons	 the	
author	 seeks	 to	 convey	 less	 rationally	 acceptable…	Didacticism	on	my	view	is	just	as	objectionable	in	works	of	computational	biology	and	cinematic	history	as	 in	 literary	 fictions	because	 it	is	primarily	an	epistemic	rather	than	aesthetic	fault.		Repp	 tries	 to	assimilate	didacticism	 in	 literary	 fiction	with	didacticism	in	 nonfiction	 (whether	 literary	 or	 not)	 as	 manifesting	 the	 same	epistemic	flaw.	But	although	works	of	nonfiction	such	as	computational	biology	and	cinematic	history	could	be	didactically	flawed	because	they	are	marked	 by	 arrogance,	 dogmatism,	 or	 prejudice,	 they	 could	 not	 be	“too	 overtly	 instructive”	 any	 more	 than	 an	 instruction	 manual	 could.	After	all,	being	instructive	is	their	express	purpose	and	raison	d’etre.	By	definition,	works	of	nonfiction	aim	at	achieving	veracity	and	conveying	it;	they	attempt	to	stick	to	the	facts	or	tell	what	actually	happened.		 In	 contrast,	 fictional	 works,	 broadly	 speaking,	 at	 most	 aim	 at	verisimilitude.	Repp	is	right	that	literary	fictions	are	didactic	if	they	are	“too	overtly	 instructive,”	 yet	he	does	not	 appear	 to	 see	why.	Trite	 as	 it	may	be	to	be	reminded,	fictional	literature’s	significant	cognitive	value,	if	 any,	 is	 conveyed	 by	 showing	 insight	 into	 human	 affairs	 via	 the	character	descriptions,	narration	of	events,	etc.,	not	by	telling	it—which	would	 make	 the	 work	 didactic.	 As	 this	 truism	 suggests,	 none	 of	 this	showing	need	be	intentional	or	“lessons	the	author	seeks	to	convey”	(pace	Repp	and	others,	e.g.,	Gibson,	2009,	sec.	II;	see	my	2017,	p.	152ff.)	Repp	(p.	274)	says	that	a	literary	fiction’s	cognitive	value	can	depend	“on	the	extent	to	which	it	provides	‘warrant’	or	legitimate	grounds	for	accepting	the	lesson.”	But	he	has	the	wrong	model.	Literary	fiction	is	not	science,	yet	 he	 tries	 to	 assimilate	 the	 two.	 Compare	 Swirski	 (2007,	 p.	 4),	who	claims	that	“historical	novels	transmit	knowledge	of	history	much	in	the	same	 manner	 that	 historians	 transmit	 it.”	 If	 this	 were	 so,	 then	 there	would	not	be	the	following	sharp	asymmetry:	For	all	we	know	without	history,	 anything	 in	 an	 historical	 novel	 could	 be	 invented.	 History	 is	needed	to	arbitrate,	yet	historical	novels	do	not	arbitrate	history.	From	these	considerations,	we	see	that	literary	fiction	cannot	be	suppositional	reasoning,	or	any	kind	of	reasoning,	 in	a	straightforward	way;	 if	 it	 were,	 it	 would	 be	 didactic	 ‘overt	 instruction’,	 which	undermines	its	status	as	literary	fiction	and	makes	it	akin	to	philosophy	or	science.	Thus,	the	global	argument,	if	any,	in	a	work	of	literary	fiction	would	 have	 to	 be	 somehow	 uncovered.	 No	 doubt	 fictional	 narrative	
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generally	 makes	 a	 supposition	 (commonly	 called	 a	 ‘premise’)	 and	determines	 what	 would,	 or	 could	 very	 well,	 follow.	 For	 instance,	Golding’s	Lord	 of	 the	 Flies	 considers	what	would	 happen	 if	 a	 group	 of	English	schoolboys	were	stranded	on	a	deserted	 jungle	 island	and	had	to	fend	for	themselves	and	remake	society.	But	these	are	primarily	‘real’	and	probabilistic	(mostly	causal)	consequences	imagined	by	the	author;	generally,	it	is	only	with	critical	interpretation1	that	there	is	a	transition	to	 more	 logical	 or	 conceptual—hence,	 argumentative—consequences.	This	means	that	if	certain	works	of	fictional	literature	holistically	exhibit	suppositional	 reasoning	 and	 thereby	 can	 constitute	 a	 source	 of	knowledge	 (if	 the	 reasoning	 is	 good),	 they	 do	 so	 indirectly	within	 the	context	of	critical	interpretation	and	all	the	vagaries	that	can	bring.	Egan	(2016,	p.	147)	pushes	such	a	point,	contending	that	“we	may	be	able	to	extract	 an	 argument	 against	 Stalinism	 from	 Animal	 Farm,	 but…our	argumentative	criticism	of	Animal	Farm	would	at	best	target	claims	we	have	come	to	entertain	because	we	read	Animal	Farm,	not	Animal	Farm	itself.”	 For	 perspective,	 notice	 how	 the	 suppositional-reasoning	approach	 differs	 from	 another	 possible	 argumentative	 approach	 to	regarding	 fictional	 literature	 as	 a	 potential	 source	 of	 knowledge.	Elsewhere	I	argue	(most	completely	and	recently	in	Plumer,	2017)	that	we	have	a	basic	intuitive	grasp	of	human	nature	and	the	principles	that	govern	it.	A	literary	fiction	may	evoke	these	principles	in	its	storytelling,	which	makes	the	narrative	believable	if	it	is	otherwise	coherent.	So	the	believability	 of	 a	 fictional	 story	 implicates	 that	 there	 is	 truth	 there,	which	amounts	to	a	transcendental	argument,	and	for	the	appropriately	reflective	 auditor,	 this	 contact	 with	 truth	 becomes	 knowledge.2	 Here,	critical	 interpretation—and	with	 it	 the	possibility	of	error,	of	course—enters	 the	 picture	 in	 reflectively	 trying	 to	 determine	which	 truths	 of	human	nature	are	implicated	by	the	work’s	believability,	not	that	there	are	truths	there.	On	the	suppositional	approach,	critical	interpretation	is		
1My	use	of	the	term	‘critical	 interpretation’	more	or	 less	conforms	to	Gibson’s	(2006,	 p.	 444):	 “Rather	 than	 directed	 at	 the	 recovery	 of	 linguistic	 meaning,	critical	 interpretation	 marks	 a	 process	 of	 articulating	 patterns	 of	 salience,	value,	 and	 significance	 in	 the	 worlds	 literary	 works	 bring	 to	 view.	 That	 is,	critical	interpretation	marks	the	moment	of	our	engagement	with	the	world	of	the	work,	and	it	has	as	its	goal	the	attempt	to	bring	to	light	what	we	find	of	consequence	in	this	world.”	
2This	satisfies	the	thesis	of	Literary	Cognitivism	(LC)—shortly	to	be	discussed	in	the	next	section	below—because	believability	with	respect	to	fiction	is	quite	a	different	thing	than	it	is	with	respect	to	nonfiction.	If	a	work	of	nonfiction	is	
believable,	 it	 is	worthy	of	belief,	but	the	term	cannot	mean	this	with	respect	to	fiction.						
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necessary	 to	 display	 the	 suppositional	 reasoning,	which	 then	must	 be	determined	 to	 be	 good	 reasoning,	 before	 any	 knowledge	 ensues.	Conversely,	for	a	believable	fiction	without	critical	interpretation,	on	the	suppositional	 approach	 all	 you	 may	 relevantly	 know	 is	 the	 work’s	‘premise’,	whereas	on	the	transcendental	view	you	know	that	as	well	as	that	the	psychosocial	principles	the	work	evokes	are	mostly	true.			4.	THE	SUPPOSITIONAL	REASONING	MODEL		Green	 may	 be	 the	 most	 ardent	 proponent	 of	 the	 view	 that	 there	 is	“literary	fiction	that	conforms	to	our	suppositional	model,”	a	model	not	presented	merely	in	the	guise	of	thought	experimentation	(2016,	p.	293;	see	also	his	2010,	2017,	and	forthcoming,	sec.	IV).	Where	P	is	a	work’s	fictional	 ‘premise’,	Green	holds	(2016,	p.	289)	that	some	works	reason	declaratively	 (supposing	 P,	 Q),	 imperatively	 (supposing	 P,	 do	 Q),	 or	interrogatively	(supposing	P,	Q?).	Of	course,	premise-beliefs	(see	section	1	 above)	 may	 enter	 the	 picture,	 and	 “it	 is	 normally	 appropriate	 to	appeal	 to	 a	 body	 of	 background	 knowledge	 to	 aid	 our	 reasoning”	 (p.	290),	 so	 the	 suppositional	 reasoning	 need	 not	 be	 pure.	 Green	 sees	conformity	 to	 the	 suppositional	 model	 as	 the	 primary	 way	 that	 the	thesis	of	 “literary	cognitivism,”	as	he	construes	 it,	 is	 satisfied.	He	casts	this	thesis	as			“Literary	Cognitivism	[LC]:	Literary	fiction	can	be	a	source	of	knowledge	in	a	way	that	depends	crucially	on	its	being	fictional”		(2010,	p.	352;	2016,	p.	286;	2017,	p.	48;	quoted	approvingly	by	Maioli	2014,	 p.	 625).	 Literary	 cognitivists	 and	 anti-cognitivists	 are	 all	concerned	 with	 fiction	 literature	 because,	 by	 definition,	 there	 is	 no	question	that	nonfictional	literature	(e.g.,	an	historical	or	bibliographical	work)	may	yield	knowledge.	In	LC	Green	tries	to	say	what	is	special	or	distinctive	about	knowledge	arising	 from	 fictional	 literature.	However,	Green	never	clearly	spells	out	the	idea	of	dependence	in	LC,	although	he	distinguishes	 LC	 from	 the	 stronger	 thesis	 (he	 does	 not	 endorse)	 that	“the	 knowledge	 literary	 fiction	 provides	 is	 not	 available	 through	 any	other	 means	 such	 as	 journalism,	 memoir,	 or	 research	 in	 social	psychology,”	a	thesis	that	might	be	called	“literary	cognitive	uniqueness”	[LCU]	 (2016,	p.	286n4).	 In	LCU,	 the	notion	of	dependence	 is	 the	usual	idea	of	cannot	exist	without.	 I	propose	that	an	adequate	 fleshing	out	of	the	idea	of	dependence	in	LC	is	that	 in	the	path	or	route	to	knowledge	from	 the	 fictional	 work,	 the	 work’s	 fictionality	 is	 integral	 (not	necessarily	that	there	is	no	other	path	to	the	knowledge,	as	per	LCU).	It	is	 because	 or	 partly	 because	 of	 its	 fictionality	 that	 the	 work	 yields	knowledge.	
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	 Green	 initially	 considers	 cases	 of	 suppositional	 reasoning	 or	“suppositions	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 argument”	 in	 “everyday	 life”	 by	 way	 of	preparing	 the	 ground	 for	 considering	 it	 in	 literary	 fiction.	 His	 first	example	 (declarative)	 is:	 “Suppose	 we	 take	 the	 3:17	 train	 to	 Union	Station.	 Then	 we	 can	 catch	 the	 4:35	 from	 there	 to	 the	 coast,	 getting	there	in	time	for	the	ferry	unless	there	is	some	delay…”		He	claims	that	“suppositions	 such	 as	 the	 proposition	 that	we	 take	 the	 3:17	 to	 Union	Station	are	a	species	of	fictions”	(2016,	p.	287).	But	this	seems	confused.	The	 proposition	 that	 we	 take	 the	 3:17	 to	 Union	 Station	 could	 be	 a	species	of	fiction	only	if	we	do	not	take	that	train.	Now,	before	3:17,	all	we	know	is	that	it	is	a	future	fact	in	the	actual	world	or	it	is	not.	Before	3:17,	 it	 is	 a	 ‘counterfactual’	 in	 only	 the	 weak	 temporal	 sense	 that	 it	obtains	 in	neither	the	present	nor	the	past	 in	the	actual	world.	Yet	the	‘premises’	 of	 literary	 fictions	 are	 paradigmatically	 metaphysical	counterfactual	 possibilities,	 that	 is,	 they	 obtain	 in	 merely	 possible	worlds—not	obtaining	ever	in	the	actual	world.		 Continuing	 with	 suppositional	 reasoning	 in	 “everyday	 life,”	Green	illustrates	the	directive	structure	of	‘supposing	P,	do	Q’:	“Imagine	animated	 demonstrations	 of	 how	 to	 change	 an	 automobile’s	 oil	filter…the	 animation,	 albeit	 fictional,	 shows	 how	 to	 do	 something”	(2016,	 p.	 288).	 Considered	 as	 showing	 how	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 type	 of	activity,	the	animation	had	better	not	be	fictional	or	else	it	would	purvey	falsehoods	 and	 misdirect.	 Considered	 as	 depicting	 a	 token	 of	 that	activity	 type,	 it	 could	 be	 fictional	 and	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 learning	engendered	conform	to	the	idea	of	dependence	in	LC	(though	not	in	LCU	of	course,	because	a	video	of	a	real	oil	filter	change	could	be	used).	Turning	 to	 cases	 of	 literary	 fiction,	 in	 the	 directive	 vein	 Green	interprets	 Flaubert’s	 Madame	 Bovary	 as	 “showing	 how	 to	 justify	adultery	 to	oneself”	 (2016,	p.	293).	 I	do	not	 see	a	problem	relevant	 to	our	 concerns,	 given	 that	 the	 novel’s	 ‘premise’	 is	 a	 metaphysical	counterfactual,	although	his	reading	may	be	a	little	obtuse	since	Emma’s	adultery	 ends	 in	 misery	 for	 pretty	 much	 all	 concerned.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 as	we	 have	 seen	 (section	 1),	 Green	 understands	Huxley’s	Brave	
New	World	(declaratively)	as	working	out	the	negative	implications	of	a	supposition	 in	the	manner	of	a	 loose	reductio	ad	absurdum.	A	problem	arises	in	satisfying	the	dependence	requirement	in	LC	if	the	supposition	could	 simply	 be	 an	 epistemic	 possibility	 (‘suppose	X,	which	 for	 all	we	know,	occurs	sometime’)	or	probabilistic	(e.g.,	 ‘suppose	X,	which	could	very	well	happen’),	not	metaphysical	counterfactual	supposition,	that	is,	distinctively	 fictional	 supposition.	 It	 is	 disputable	 whether	Brave	 New	
World’s	supposition	that	society	is	“organized	along	the	lines	dictated	by	hedonistic	utilitarianism”	is	actually	true	of	a	society	somewhere,	or	at	some	time	was	or	probably	will	be	true.	The	same	applies	(e.g.)	 to	 the	supposition	 of	 Atwood’s	 The	 Handmaid’s	 Tale	 that	 women	 become	
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extremely	 subjugated	 under	 a	U.S.	 totalitarian	 theocracy,	 especially	 as	concerns	reproduction.	The	point	is,	one	cannot	say	that	a	work	imparts	knowledge	(partly)	because	of	its	fictionality	qua	counterfactuality	if	in	key	respects	its	counterfactuality	is	not	evident.	It	 might	 be	 objected	 that	 whether	 a	 literary	 fiction’s	 key	supposition	 is	 counterfactual	 may	 vary	 with	 how	 specifically	 it	 is	formulated.	Brave	New	World’s	 supposition	 could	 be	 cast	 as	 including	(e.g.)	that	there	are	no	visible	signs	of	aging	in	the	World	State,	Soma	is	the	 state-distributed	 hedonistic	 drug,	 there	 are	 biweekly	 and	 state-required	orgies,	hatcheries	produce	human	embryos—all	in	contrast	to	natural	processes	outside	the	World	State	in	Savage	Reservation	in	New	Mexico.	 Probably	 not	 all	 of	 this	 is	 needed	 to	 make	 the	 supposition	 a	metaphysical	counterfactual.	Determining	the	right	level	of	generality	is	no	doubt	an	important	and	difficult	question,	perhaps	even	intractable.	Nevertheless,	 it	may	 be	 that	 the	more	 the	 focus	 is	 on	particulars	 that	make	 a	 supposition	 a	 nonactual	 possibility,	 the	 less	 likely	 it	 is	 that	knowledge	 or	 understanding	 pertaining	 to	 the	 actual	 world	 could	 be	gained.	 Otherwise,	 Green’s	 formulating	 the	 entire	 reductio	 he	 sees	 in	Huxley’s	work	in	fully	general	terms	would	appear	to	be	accidental.	Green	 regards	 Stephen	 King’s	 Salem’s	 Lot	 as	 having	 “an	interrogative	dimension”	 in	that	 it	compels	“readers	to	ask	themselves	whether	 there	are	any	epistemic	 situations	 in	which	 rationality	would	oblige	 them	 to	 give	 up	 their	 naturalistic	 scruples	 and	 believe	 in	 the	supernatural”	 (2016,	 p.	 292).	 This	 kind	 of	 case	 raises	 two	 general	concerns.	First,	even	assuming	that	the	question	posed	is	a	good	one	or	“helps	 to	 build	 a	 framework	 in	 which	 an	 intellectual	 advance	 can	 be	made”	 (Green	 2017,	 p.	 51),	 it	 seems	 that	 what	 would	 enhance	 our	knowledge	or	make	the	advance	is	the	answer.	 It	 is	not	clear	that	good	suppositional	 reasoning	 in	 the	 interrogative	 form	 could	 support	 LC.	Second,	 the	example	here	raises	the	 issue	of	 impossible	 fictions,	 that	 is,	ones	 that	 involve	 a	 logical	 or	 metaphysical	 (not	 merely	 a	 physical)	impossibility.	 Rather	 than	 interrogatively,	 Green	 (2017,	 pp.	 57-58)	considers	 Stoker’s	 Dracula	 declaratively,	 and	 takes	 it	 as	 similarly	supposing	 that	 its	main	 protagonists,	who	 are	 “quite	 rational	 people,”	are	 “faced	 with	 empirical	 evidence	 undermining…naturalism.”	 If	 this	story	 showed,	 as	 Green	 appears	 to	 suggest,	 that	 “commitment	 to	rationality	 does	 not	 by	 itself	 guarantee	 a	 commitment	 to	 naturalism,”	then	 the	 story	 would	 provide	 that	 knowledge	 partly	 because	 of	 the	story’s	metaphysical	 counterfactuality.	 (Green	would	say	LCU	 is	not	at	issue	 since	 as	 an	 alternate	 route	 to	 that	 possible	 knowledge,	 he	 cites	Cleanthes’	arguments	in	Hume’s	Dialogues	Concerning	Natural	Religion.)	However,	it	seems	that	such	a	knowledge	claim	is	disputable	on	logical	grounds	 by	 making	 the	 appropriate	 conceptual	 connections	 between	the	scientific	method,	rationality,	and	naturalism	(e.g.,	a	commitment	to	
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naturalism	 is	 a	 condition	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 scientific	 method,	broadly	 construed,	 which	 in	 turn	 defines	 rationality).	 Taken	 as	 not	involving	such	claims,	Dracula	could	provide	knowledge	by	considering	nonactual	 metaphysical	 possibilities	 that	 are	 important	 for	understanding	actuality.	At	 any	 rate,	 it	 is	particularly	hard	 to	 see	how	knowledge	could	be	gained	from	impossible	fictions.3			5.	CONCLUSION			Our	 topic	 has	 been	 whether	 literary	 fiction	 can	 be	 suppositional	reasoning.	We	have	seen	 that	 the	 reasoning	 in	 thought	experiments,	 if	anything,	 would	 be	 suppositional	 in	 nature,	 and	 although	 it	 is	 often	claimed	that	at	least	some	works	of	fictional	literature	constitute	a	class	of	 thought	 experiments,	 this	 claim	 is	 misleading.	 However,	 we	 have	found	 that	 indirectly,	 within	 the	 context	 of	 judicious	 critical	interpretation,	 works	 of	 fictional	 literature	 can	 holistically	 exhibit	suppositional	 reasoning	and	 thereby	 constitute	a	 source	of	knowledge	(if	 the	reasoning	 is	good)	 in	a	way	 that	supports	 the	 thesis	of	Literary	Cognitivism.	 Evident	 constraints	 on	 this	 include	 that	 the	 form	 of	 the	suppositional	reasoning	needs	to	be	declarative	or	imperative,	and	that	the	 fictional	 ‘premise’	 of	 the	 work	 needs	 to	 be	 a	 metaphysical	counterfactual	possibility,	not	merely	a	temporal	counterfactual	and	not	merely	an	epistemic	possibility	or	probabilistic	supposition.		So,	 yes,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 literary	 fiction	 can	 be	 suppositional	reasoning,	although	only	with	significant	qualification.				ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:	I	am	grateful	to	Olivia	Odoffin,	Kenneth	Olson,	Teresa	 Plumer,	 Katharina	 Stevens,	 and	 audience	 members	 at	 the	 3rd	European	 Conference	 on	 Argumentation	 for	 helpful	 comments	 on	earlier	drafts.			REFERENCES		Balcerak	 Jackson,	M.,	&	Balcerak	 Jackson,	B.	 (2013).	Reasoning	as	a	 source	of	justification.	Philosophical	Studies,	164(1),	113–126.	Barnett,	D.	(2006).	Zif	is	if.	Mind,	115(2),	519-565.	Bourne,	C.,	&	Bourne,	E.	C.	(2018).	Personification	without	impossible	content.	
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